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Abstract Disproportionality indices aim at measuring to what extent the
composition of a parliament differs from the distribution of the votes among
parties. Malapportionment indices measure to what extent the number of par-
liament seats attached to each district difffers from the distribution of the
population among districts. Since there exist many different such indices, some
conditions have recently been proposed for assessing the merits of the various
indices. In this paper, we propose a characterization of two disproportional-
ity and malapportionment indices: the Duncan and Duncan index (also called
Loosemore-Hanby) and the Lijphart index.
Keywords disproportionality index · malapportionment · proportional
representation · Duncan and Duncan · Loosemore-Hanby · Lijphart
1 Introduction
Suppose 100 voters are to elect 10 representatives in a parliament. There are
3 political parties respectively receiving 25, 43 and 32 votes. If we want to
achieve proportional representation, the three parties should respectively have
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2.5 (i.e., 10× 25/100), 4.3 and 3.2 representatives1. This ideal representation
is not feasible because it is not integer. Hence, one has to choose between
one of the many different ways to obtain an integer number of representatives.
Many allocation methods (for instance the Hare quota or the Droop quota) for
choosing the right distribution of representatives have been proposed [2]. In
order to compare these methods, or more precisely to compare the outcomes
of these methods, political scientists have proposed several indices to measure
the dissimilarity between the perfect proportional (but usually non-integer)
distribution and a feasible one: the so-called disproportionality indices. The
first one was the Rae index [17], soon followed by many others [10]. Around the
year 2000, there were so many disproportionality indices at hand that political
scientists realized that a systematic approach to the analysis of disproportion-
ality indices was necessary.2 This led them to proposing some conditions or
properties that disproportionality indices should ideally satisfy [4, 10, 11, 18],
but no characterization of a disproportionality index has been proposed so far
in political sciences3.
A related problem is the apportionment of seats among electoral districts.
There also, some malapportionment indices have been proposed; they are
formally equivalent to disproportionality indices and are also discussed by
[4, 10, 11, 18].
Another related problem is that of comparing two probability distribu-
tions. For instance, [7] reviews more than 60 dissimilarity indices between two
probability distributions. If we model a parliament by means of proportions
of seats, then dissimilarity indices (between two probability distributions) and
disproportionality indices (between a seat distribution and a vote distribu-
tion) are formally equivalent. But such a modelling would implicitly assume
a homogeneity hypothesis (i.e. the size of a parliament does not matter; only
proportions matter). We do not consider this homogeneity hypothesis as com-
pelling and we therefore consider our problem as related but distinct from the
measurement of dissimilarity between two probability distributions.
We will not propose and champion a new disproportionality index or sup-
port an existing one because we think that a single best universal dispropor-
tionality index does not exist. For instance, we probably do not need the same
index if we want to measure malapportionment in a small or in a large country.
Instead of supporting a specific index, we will provide a formal framework in
which it is possible to analyze and compare various indices, using clear and
explicit arguments. This is in line with the authors’ previous work in decision
theory [e.g. 5, 6].
1 In a recent paper, [16] argues that the concept of proportional representation is both
vague and ambiguous. To make things clear, we consider one-option balloting and propor-
tional allocation of seats.
2 [10, 11] call this an axiomatic approach.
3 No disproportionality index has been characterized, yet several characterizations of al-
location methods (i.e., techniques to allocate seats to parties in view of the electoral result)
are available in the literature [2].
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2 Definitions, notation and some indices
In this section, we introduce the notation that will be needed. We also define
several disproportionality indices.
2.1 Notation and definitions
The set N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2, represents the set of parties or electoral
districts. We will throughout consider that N does not vary. We will consider
that the distribution of votes among parties can adequately be described by
a vector with rational components4. This distribution will be called the target
distribution or just target. The set of non-negative rational numbers is denoted
by Q+. The set of strictly positive (resp. non-negative) real numbers is denoted
by R++ (resp. R+). The set of natural numbers is denoted by N and N0 =
N\{0}. The target distribution is pi = (pi1, . . . , pin), with pii ∈ Q+ for all i ∈ N
and
∑
i∈N pii = 1. In the context of proportional seat allocation, pi is the vector
of the relative vote shares among the parties; in the context of apportionment,
it is the vector of the relative population shares among the districts.
A parliament is described by the distribution of seats among parties. It is
denoted by x = (x1, . . . , xn), with xi ∈ N for all i ∈ N and where xi represents
the number of seats allocated to party or district i. The size of parliament
x is denoted by s(x) =
∑
i∈N xi. The relative frequency distribution in a
parliament x is x/s(x) = (x1/s(x), . . . , xn/s(x)). The set of all parliaments is
X = NN , i.e. the set of all mappings from N to N. The set Π of all target
distributions is a subset of QN+ . Formally, Π = {pi ∈ QN+ :
∑
i∈N pii = 1}.
Definition 1 A disproportionality index f is a mapping from X ×Π to R+
satisfying f(x, pi) = 0 iff x/s(x) = pi.
A disproportionality index measures how far from the target pi the actual seat
distribution x in the parliament is. It is equal to zero only when the seat
distribution is perfectly proportional.
The reader may have the impression that comparisons of disproportionality
indices across different elections are not possible in our setting because the set
N of parties is fixed while the set of parties in real elections is almost never the
same. This is not completely correct. Indeed, we can consider some very large
set N (containing e.g. 100 parties) and, when we want to model a particular
election involving a subset M ⊂ N of parties, we just ensure that the parties
in N \M have 0 votes and 0 seats. We will discuss this in detail in Section 4.
2.2 Two disproportionality indices
We begin with an additive index: fDD(x, pi) =
∑
i∈N |xi/s(x)− pii|. For each
party i, we compute the deviation xi/s(x) − pii between the proportion in
4 We thus implicitly consider that the size of the set of voters does not matter.
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the parliament (xi/s(x)) and the target proportion (pii). We summarize the
n such deviations by means of their sum after taking absolute values in order
to avoid compensation between positive and negative deviations. Index fDD is
the Duncan and Duncan [8] (also called Loosemore-Hanby [13]) index.5
A different index is fL(x, pi) = maxi∈N |xi/s(x)− pii|. Here, instead of using
the sum as a summary, we focus on the largest absolute deviation. Index fL
(or Lijphart index) has been proposed in [12].
Indices fDD and fL correspond to L
p distances (with p = 1 and ∞ resp.)
between the vectors pi and x/s(x). Many more indices can be defined by just
considering other values of p or other distances. If we do not limit ourselves to
distances, many other indices can be thought of. For instance, [18] discusses
nineteen disproportionality indices.
3 Characterizations
As already mentioned in the introduction, we do not promote a particular in-
dex. For the same reason, we will not try to justify our properties on normative
grounds. Properties need not be compelling: they should be simple properties,
easy to understand and as elementary as possible. They allow us to break
down an index (possibly defined by a complex formula) into a small number of
elementary and simple blocks. And if one of the properties characterizing an
index is easy to understand but the social planner does not find it adequate,
then he has a good reason not to use that index. For a deep discussion about
the utility of this kind of analysis, we refer to [14, pp.196–202]. See also [3,
Chapter 1] in which various views on using characterizations are described
and compared. Our view, in the context of disproportionality measurement, is
close to that of [19], in the context of game theory and resource allocation.
In this paper, we characterize two simple and popular indices: fDD and fL.
These two characterizations should be considered as examples of what can be
achieved and expected within the framework we propose.
3.1 Characterization of index fDD
3.1.1 Properties
Homogeneity. Suppose n = 2 and party 1 has 400 seats in parliament x with
size s(x) = 600 and 800 seats in parliament y with s(y) = 1 200. In terms of
proportions, x and y are identical and this suggests that the disproportionality
index (given the same target pi) should be equal in the two parliaments. The
first property we discuss formalizes this idea: it imposes that the size of a
5 The Duncan and Duncan index is often presented as 1/2 ×∑i∈N |pii − xi/s(x)|. The
factor 1/2 is convenient in applications because it scales the index between 0 and 1. We
purposefully drop this factor because it makes the index simpler. The difference between the
two forms of the index is not more relevant than the difference between a length measurement
in meters or in feet.
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parliament does not matter, in the sense that scaling up or down a parliament
by a multiplicative factor does not change its index.
P 1 Homogeneity. For all λ ∈ N0 and all x ∈ X, f(λx, pi) = f(x, pi).
Let us show that index fDD satisfies Homogeneity.
fDD(λx, pi) =
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − λxis(λx)
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − λxiλs(x)
∣∣∣∣ = ∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x)
∣∣∣∣ = fDD(x, pi).
Although Homogeneity seems appealing, if we consider very small and very
large parliaments, then it is perhaps no longer so compelling. Suppose n = 2,
s(x) = 6, s(y) = 600 and the target is fifty-fifty. Suppose party 1 has 4 seats
in parliament x. Then 4 seats for party 1 with respect to a target of 3 seems a
very small deviation, not really indicating a representativity problem. On the
contrary, 400 seats for party 1 in parliament y with respect to a target of 300
seems problematic, and it seems reasonable to have a higher disproportionality
index for y than for x, although they are identical in terms of proportions.
Even worse: suppose party 1 has two seats in parliament z with s(z) = 3. In
terms of proportions, z is identical to x and y. But a perfect proportionality
is impossible in a parliament of size three with a fifty-fifty target. It would be
unfair to associate the same disproportionality index to parliaments z and x
or y. We move to another property.
Radial Linearity. Consider a target pi and two parliaments x and y with the
same size. Then s(x)pi is a perfectly proportional parliament with the same
size as x. Suppose that x and y lie on the same ray originating in s(x)pi. Then,
(x+ y)/2 lies between x and y, on the same ray, and a very mild monotonic-
ity requirement is that f((x + y)/2, pi) lies between f(x, pi) and f(y, pi). This
monotonicity is satisfied by fDD and we could use it to characterize the ranking
induced by fDD (see Section 4.2), but we chose to characterize the index fDD.
We thus need a stronger condition, fixing the exact position of f((x+ y)/2, pi)
between f(x, pi) and f(y, pi). The simplest thing we can then do is to say that
this position is exactly halfway and we can motivate this by a kind of principle
of insufficient reason. This is formalized hereafter.
P 2 Radial Linearity. If x and y are two parliaments such that (a) s(x) =
s(y), (x+ y)/2 ∈ X and (b) x = αs(x)pi + (1− α)y for some α ∈ [0, 1], then
f
(
x+ y
2
, pi
)
=
f(x, pi) + f(y, pi)
2
.
Radial Linearity is a necessary condition for fDD. Indeed, fDD(x+ y, pi)
=
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xi + yi2s(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 12 ∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣2pii − xi + yis(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 12 ∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x) + pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣ .
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Since x = αs(x)pi+ (1− α)y, we know that {i ∈ N : xi/s(x) ≥ pii} = {i ∈ N :
yi/s(y) ≥ pii} and we have fDD(x+ y, pi)
=
1
2
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x) + pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2
(∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x)
∣∣∣∣+∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣
)
=
fDD(x, pi) + fDD(y, pi)
2
.
Radial Linearity may seem a (too) strong condition and characterizing an
index with an additive form such as fDD with Radial Linearity may seem too
obvious for being interesting. Actually, there are many non-additive indices
satisfying Radial Linearity. Index fL is such an index (see Section 3.2). The
main effect of Radial Linearity is not to make things additive, but rather to
force the index to vary linearly when a parliament deviates from perfect pro-
portionality in a given direction. Notice also that, despite an additive structure,
the index fχ2 defined by [15] as
fχ2(x, pi) =
∑
i∈N
(
(xi/s(x)− pii)2
pii
)
does not satisfy Radial Linearity.
Substitution. Let 1i be an element of X such that 1ik = 0 for all k ∈ N \ {i}
and 1ii = 1. For example, 1
2 = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0). If we add 1i to a parliament, we
obtain a new parliament where an extra seat has been allocated to party i.
Suppose n = 3, the target pi is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and consider the parliament
x = (10, 40, 50). Parties 2 and 3 are overrepresented. We move a seat from
party 3 to party 2, yielding y = (10, 41, 49). Parties 2 and 3 are still overrep-
resented. It makes sense to consider that we did not improve the situation:
nothing changed for the underrepresented parties; they did not gain a single
seat. We may therefore request that f(x, pi) = f(y, pi). Put differently, we can
move a seat in a parliament from a party to another, without changing the
index value, as long as both parties are in excess (or both in deficit) before
and after the change.
P 3 Substitution. Suppose [(xi − 1)/s(x) ≥ pii and xj/s(x) ≥ pij ] or [0 <
xi/s(x) ≤ pii and (xj + 1)/s(x) ≤ pij ]. Then f(x, pi) = f(x− 1i + 1j , pi).
Notice that this condition is vacuous when n = 2. Substitution is satisfied by
fDD. We only show it for the first part of the condition (corresponding to the
case of parties in excess).
fDD(x− 1i + 1j , pi) =
∣∣∣∣xi − 1s(x) − pii
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣xj + 1s(x) − pij
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∣∣∣∣ xks(x) − pik
∣∣∣∣ .
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The dimensions in excess in x and x − 1i + 1j are the same. The right-hand
side of the above equation can therefore be rewritten as∣∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ xjs(x) − pij
∣∣∣∣+ ∑
k∈N\{i,j}
∣∣∣∣ xks(x) − pik
∣∣∣∣ = fDD(x, pi).
Invariance. We need an additional condition to characterize fDD when pi is
not fixed. It says that, if a parliament is perfectly proportional and if we move
a seat from a party to another (thus moving away from the target), then the
value of the index is the same, whatever the target is.
P 4 Invariance. For any i, j ∈ N and any λ ∈ N0, if λpi, λpi−1i+1j , λpi′, λpi′−
1i + 1j ∈ X then f(λpi − 1i + 1j , pi) = f(λpi′ − 1i + 1j , pi′).
Index fDD satisfies Invariance. Indeed,
fDD(λpi − 1i + 1j , pi) =
∣∣∣∣λpii − 1λ − pii
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣λpij + 1λ − pij
∣∣∣∣ = 2λ.
In the same way, fDD(λpi
′ − 1i + 1j , pi′) = 2/λ. This proves that fDD(λpi −
1i + 1j , pi) = fDD(λpi
′ − 1i + 1j , pi′).
Invariance is a kind of symmetry condition. It is, to some extent, a desirable
property, but it comes at a cost. Suppose indeed pi = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), pi′ =
(1/300, 149/300, 150/300), x = (99, 101, 100), y = (0, 150, 150) and consider
the following situations: (a) parliament x combined with target pi and (b)
parliament y combined with pi′. In both situations, party one has one seat
less than what it deserves. In situation (a), the relative deviation for party 1 is
1/100 (it deserves 100 seats); in situation (b), the relative deviation for party 1
is 1/1. One could therefore argue that f(x, pi) should be smaller than f(y, pi′).
Yet Invariance (with λ = 300, i = 1 and j = 2) implies f(x, pi) = f(y, pi′).
3.1.2 Results
We can now state a first characterization theorem6.
Theorem 1 A disproportionality index f satisfies Homogeneity, Radial Linearity
and Substitution iff, for all pi ∈ Π, there exists γpi ∈ R++ such that
f(x, pi) = γpi
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii
∣∣∣∣ = γpifDD(x, pi). (1)
If Invariance is added to the list of necessary and sufficient conditions, then
γpi = γpi′ for all pi, pi
′ ∈ Π. The properties are logically independent, but
Substitution can be omitted when n = 2.
6 A characterization of the L1 distance (obviously linked to index fDD) already exists [9].
It is not completely relevant to our problem because the authors consider it as a distance
between two points in Rn while we are interested in the ‘distance’ between a point in NN
and a point in QN with the constraint that the sum of the coordinates be 1.
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The first part of this result (without Invariance) is useful when pi is not
allowed to vary. The second part allows us to make comparisons of indices
across parliaments in different countries or across time, where pi is not constant.
The idea of the proof7 is as follows. We first assume pi is fixed and we show
that f depends only on the relative distribution x/s(x), thanks to Homogeneity.
Any parliament can then be described by its position (x/s(x)) in the simplex
Π. We then partition the set Π into several domains. Each domain is char-
acterized by a set of parties in excess (i.e., with a proportion xi/s(x) larger
than pii). Using Radial Linearity, we show that f varies linearly on each line
segment in Π having pi as an endpoint. Notice that such a line segment always
belongs to a single domain. We then show that, within a domain, the set of
all points with equal value of the index is a hyperplane, by Substitution. It
follows that f is an affine function in each domain and it can therefore be
represented by (1).
3.2 Characterization of index fL
3.2.1 Properties
It is easy to check that fL does not satisfy Substitution. Does this imply
that fL is a bad index? We do not think so, because it is not that obvious
that Substitution is a compelling condition in all contexts, as illustrated in
the following example. Suppose pi = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4); then, according to
Substitution, x = (0, 20, 25, 55) and y = (0, 20, 40, 40) must have the same dis-
proportionality. Yet people may have a different opinion and reason as follows:
parliaments x and y do an equally bad job with respect to parties 1 and 2, but
x does also discriminate between parties 3 and 4, while y does not. So, one
could argue that the disproportionality index of y should be lower than that of
x. In such a case, Substitution could be questioned. We will therefore propose
a slightly different condition, after introducing a new piece of notation.
For every i ∈ N , pi being fixed, define P (i) = {x ∈ X : xis(x) − pii ≥∣∣∣ xjs(x) − pij∣∣∣ ∀j ∈ N}. In words, P (i) is the set of all parliaments such that
party i is in excess and has the maximal deviation in absolute value. Similarly,
M(i) = {x ∈ X : pii − xis(x) ≥
∣∣∣ xjs(x) − pij∣∣∣ ∀j ∈ N}. The set M(i) interprets
similarly. For every i, P (i) and M(i) cannot be both empty.
Suppose n = 3, the target pi is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and consider the parliament
x = (30, 30, 40). The largest deviation w.r.t. the target occurs for party 3. We
move a seat from party 1 to party 2, yielding y = (29, 31, 40). The largest
deviation w.r.t. the target still occurs for party 3. It makes sense to consider
that we did not improve the situation: nothing changed for the party with the
maximal deviation; it did not gain or loose a single seat. We may therefore
request that f(x, pi) = f(y, pi). Put differently, we can move a seat in a par-
7 All proofs are deferred to Section 5
Characterization of two disproportionality indices 9
liament from a party to another, without changing the index value, as long as
the parties with maximal deviations remain so after the change. Formally,
P 5 Substitution*. Suppose that x and x−1i+1j ∈ P (k) or x and x−1i+1j ∈
M(k), with k /∈ {i, j}. Then f(x, pi) = f(x− 1i + 1j , pi).
Notice that this condition is vacuous when n = 2. Substitution* is satisfied by
fL. We show it only for the first part of the condition, the other part being
similar. Since x and x− 1i + 1j ∈ P (k), with k /∈ {i, j}, we have
fL(x− 1i + 1j , pi) =
∣∣∣∣ xks(x) − pik
∣∣∣∣ = fL(x, pi).
3.2.2 Results
Proposition 1 (Particular case). If n = 2 or 3, then indices fDD and fL are
identical, up to a multiplicative constant. More precisely, fL = fDD/2.
Proposition 1 no longer holds when n ≥ 4. Indeed, let x = (30, 35, 20, 15),
y = (32, 37, 19, 12) and pi = (1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4). Then fL(x, pi) = 0.1 and
fL(y, pi) = 0.13 while fDD(x, pi) = 0.3 and fDD(y, pi) = 0.38. So, there is no λ
such that fL = λfDD. We now turn to the general case.
Theorem 2 A disproportionality index f satisfies Homogeneity, Radial Linearity
and Substitution* iff, ∀pi ∈ Π, ∃γpi ∈ R++ s.t. f(x, pi) = γpi maxi∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣ =
γpi fL(x, pi). If Invariance is added to the list of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions, then γpi = γpi′ for all pi, pi
′ ∈ Π. The properties are logically independent,
but Substitution* can be omitted when n = 2.
4 Discussion
We have shown that fL and fDD both satisfy Homogeneity, Radial Linearity
and Invariance, while they differ only by the kind of substitution they satisfy.
4.1 Properties for the measurement of disproportionality in the literature
We mentioned in Section 1 the existence of some papers presenting properties
for indices of disproportionality. In this discussion, we will focus on the eight
properties presented in [11] because they largely overlap with properties in
other papers and they are more precisely stated than in the other papers
(notice though that they are stated for a proportionality index and not a
disproportionality index, but it is easy to adapt them). For space reasons, we
will not discuss the eight properties individually. Let us just make two remarks.
The eight properties are not strong enough to obtain a characterization.
Indeed, the cosine measure discussed in [11] satisfies all eight properties, but
the square or the square root of the cosine measure also satisfies all eight
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properties. So, we definitely need to define some new ones in order to charac-
terize some index. But, of course, we use some of the properties proposed in
[11] (their Scale Invariance is our Homogeneity) and some of our new prop-
erties, taken individually or jointly, imply or are implied by some properties
in [11]. For instance, their Dalton’s principle of transfers is implied by our
Radial Linearity.
Second, we find some of the properties used in [11] irrelevant for charac-
terizing an index. In particular, that the maximal value of the index should be
1. A maximal value equal to 100 (or any positive number) would be equally
fine. It is just a matter of convenience, without any substantial consequence.
4.2 Index vs ranking
There are cases where we need a ranking of the parliaments and not an in-
dex. Since many indices induce the same ranking8, we need stronger proper-
ties for characterizing an index than for characterizing a ranking. In particu-
lar, the ranking induced by fDD (resp. fL) is characterized by Homogeneity,
Substitution (resp. Substitution*), Invariance (all restated in terms of rank-
ings) and a monotonicity condition much weaker than Radial Linearity.
4.3 Comparisons across elections
Our setting assumes that the set N of parties does not vary. Yet, if we want to
compare the disproportionality of two parliaments after two different elections
(in the same country at time t1 and t2 or in different countries), we will proba-
bly face different sets of parties. We saw in Section 2 that this problem can be
tackled by adopting a large set N of parties so that any realistic situation can
be modelled by imposing pii = 0 = xi for some i’s. This raises some questions.
Is an election with 4 parties equivalent to an election with the same 4 plus
96 other parties having zero vote? If we want to analyze indices like the Rae
index9, where the number of parties plays a role in the definition of the index,
then our setting is not adequate, because the number of parties is some large
number without any real meaning and it does not vary. Yet, for the indices
characterized in this paper and for most popular indices, adding dummies does
not impact the value of the disproportionality index. So, although not perfect,
our setting seems fine for analyzing many interesting indices.
Is there a better setting? There is at least a more general one. We can con-
sider a universal set Ω of parties, for instance Ω = N, and, for each particular
election, a specific subset N of Ω. The index f is then a function with three
arguments: N, x and pi. We can then compare f(N, x, pi) with f(N ′, x′, pi′).
In such a setting, it would be tempting to impose the following condition:
8 Notice that fDD, f
2
DD and exp(fDD) all induce the same ranking. Actually, all strictly
increasing functions of a given index induce the same ranking as that index.
9 The Rae index is defined as fDD/n.
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f(N, x, pi) = f(N ′, x′, pi′) whenever i /∈ N , N ′ = N ∪{i}, x′i = 0 = pi′i, x′j = xj
and pi′j = pij for all j ∈ N . This amounts to saying that adding a party without
votes nor seats to an election does not modify the disproportionality index.
This is of course not the case for the Rae index, but it holds for most pop-
ular indices. If we impose this property, then the remaining set of indices is
exactly the set we can analyze in our setting with N fixed. This justifies the
use of our setting. If we do not impose this property, then we can analyze a
larger set of indices. We can also state some interesting properties saying, for
instance, what should happen when several parties merge into a bigger one,
inheriting all votes issued in favor of the original parties (as in Independence
from split, [10]). This is not possible in our setting with N fixed. This shows
the superiority of the more general setting, but it comes at a price: a heavier
formalism.
In conclusion, no setting is perfect. Thanks to the simplicity of our setting,
we can use a simple notation and focus on some simple ideas underlying the
Duncan and Duncan index as well as the Lijphart index.
5 Proofs
Lemma 1 Suppose pi is fixed. If a diversity index f satisfies Homogeneity,
then f(x, pi) = F (x/s(x)), for some mapping F : Π → R+.
Proof. Since pi is fixed, we can define a mapping g : X → R+ such that
f(x, pi) = g(x). Define the mapping F : Π → R+ as follows. For any p ∈ Π,
F (p) = g(x) if there is x ∈ X such that p = x/s(x). The mapping F is
defined everywhere because p has rational components and, hence, there is
always x ∈ X such that p = x/s(x). The mapping F is well defined. Indeed,
suppose there are x, y such that p = x/s(x) and p = y/s(y). By Homogeneity,
f(x, pi) = f(y, pi). Therefore, F (p) = g(x) = g(y). 2
Thanks to this lemma, when pi is fixed, we can consider f as a mapping
defined on the (n − 1) dimensional simplex Π (more precisely, the points in
the simplex with rational coordinates) and we can therefore use a graphical
representation when there are three categories, as in Fig. 1.
Lemma 2 Suppose p, q are two elements of Π such that p = αpi + (1 − α)q
for some α ∈ [0, 1]. If f satisfies Homogeneity and Radial Linearity, then
F
(
p+ q
2
)
=
F (p) + F (q)
2
, (2)
with F defined as in Lemma 1.
Proof. Clearly, (p + q)/2 belongs to Π. Since F is defined everywhere,
there are two parliaments x, y such that x/s(x) = p and y/s(y) = q. Hence
F (p) = f(x, pi) and F (q) = f(y, pi). By Homogeneity, F (p) = f(x, pi) =
f(2s(y)x, pi) and F (q) = f(y, pi) = f(2s(x)y, pi). The two parliaments s(y)x
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pi
∏{1,2}
∏{1}
∏{2}∏{2,3}
∏{3}
∏{1,3}
(1,0,0)
(0,1,0)(0,0,1)
pi
P(p,{1,2})
(1,0,0)
(0,1,0)(0,0,1)
p
Fig. 1 Left: the domains ΠJ . The set Π consists of all points in the triangle with rational
coordinates. Right: an affine subspace P (p, J).
and s(x)y have the same size, i.e., s(x)s(y). Moreover, s(y)x = αs(s(y)x)pi +
(1 − α)s(x)y for some α ∈ [0, 1] and (2s(y)x + 2s(x)y)/2 ∈ X. Hence we can
apply Radial Linearity and we find
F (p) + F (q)
2
=
f(2s(y)x, pi) + f(2s(x)y, pi)
2
Rad.Lin.
= f
(
s(y)x+ s(x)y, pi
)
.
By definition of F ,
f(s(y)x+ s(x)y, pi) = F
(
s(y)x+ s(x)y
2s(x)s(y)
)
= F
(
p+ q
2
)
,
from which we easily infer (2). 2
Let us consider a non-empty strict subset J ⊂ N and define
ΠJ = {p ∈ Π : pi ≥ pii ∀i ∈ J and pi ≤ pii ∀i /∈ J}.
All these subsets are represented in Figure 1 left (in case n = 3). Notice that
the union of all such sets (letting J vary) covers Π; formally,
⋃
∅6=J(N ΠJ = Π.
But these sets do not partition Π because they intersect (when some pi = pii).
In particular, ∀J ⊂ N, J 6= ∅, pi ∈ ΠJ . Notice also that ΠJ contains only one
point in some cases. More precisely, ΠJ = {pi} iff pii = 0 for all i /∈ J .
Lemma 3 Suppose pi is fixed. For every non-empty J ⊂ N , the set ΠJ is
rational convex, i.e., ∀p, q ∈ ΠJ , ∀α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, αp+ (1− α)q ∈ ΠJ .
Proof. This results from the fact that ΠJ is the intersection of two rational
convex sets: (1) the polyhedral cone with vertex pi, defined by the inequalities
pi ≥ pii ∀i ∈ J and pi ≤ pii ∀i /∈ J and (2) the set Π. 2
Given a point p ∈ Π, there can be several non-empty sets J ⊂ N such that
p ∈ ΠJ (this is the case when pi = pii for some i ∈ N). For every p ∈ Π, if
p ∈ ΠJ , we define the set P (p, J) =
{
q ∈ ΠJ :
∑
j∈J qj =
∑
j∈J pj
}
. The set
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P (p, J) is the intersection of the convex set ΠJ , located in the hyperplane {q ∈
QN :
∑
j∈N qj = 1}, with the hyperplane {q ∈ QN :
∑
j∈J qj =
∑
j∈J pj}.
Whenever ΠJ is not reduced to {pi}, these two hyperplanes are distinct and,
hence, P (p, J) is located in an affine subspace of dimension n − 2 in QN . A
set P (p, J) is depicted in Fig. 1 right (with n = 3). The sets P (p, J) with
p varying in ΠJ form a partition of ΠJ because, for all p, p
′ ∈ ΠJ , we have
P (p, J) 6= P (p′, J) iff ∑j∈J pj 6= ∑j∈J p′j .
Lemma 4 Suppose pi is fixed. If ΠJ 6= {pi}, then
min
p∈ΠJ
∑
j∈J
pj =
∑
j∈J
pij < max
p∈ΠJ
∑
j∈J
pj = 1.
The maximum is attained by all p ∈ ΠJ such that pj = 0 for all j /∈ J .
Proof. If ΠJ 6= {pi}, there is p ∈ ΠJ such that p 6= pi. Hence, for some
j ∈ J , pj > pij and, consequently,
∑
j∈J pj >
∑
j∈J pij . Since pi ∈ ΠJ , this
establishes that
∑
j∈J pij = minp∈ΠJ
∑
j∈J pj < maxp∈ΠJ
∑
j∈J pj .
Clearly, if p is such that pj = 0 for all j /∈ J , then
∑
j∈J pj = 1 and this
sum is maximal. Such a p always exists, since J 6= N . 2
Lemma 5 Suppose pi is fixed and f satisfies Homogeneity and Substitution.
For every non-empty J ⊂ N , ∀p ∈ ΠJ , ∀q ∈ P (p, J), we have F (p) = F (q).
Proof. Consider some p, q as in the statement of the lemma. By definition
of F , there are x, y such that p = x/s(x) and q = y/s(y). By Homogeneity,
f(x, pi) = f(s(y)x, pi) and f(y, pi) = f(s(x)y, pi). The two parliaments s(y)x
and s(x)y have the same size. Moreover
∑
j∈J qj =
∑
j∈J pj and
∑
j /∈J qj =∑
j /∈J pj . We therefore have
∑
j∈J s(x)yj =
∑
j∈J s(y)xj and
∑
j /∈J s(x)yj =∑
j /∈J s(y)xj . This means that we can ‘move’ from s(x)y to s(y)x by a se-
ries of successive exchanges between pairs of dimensions in excess or between
pairs of dimension in deficit, as in the statement of Substitution. Therefore,
f(s(x)y, pi) = f(s(y)x, pi) and F (p) = F (q). 2
Lemma 6 Suppose pi is fixed and f satisfies Homogeneity and Radial Linearity.
Let J be a non-empty subset of N , and p be an element of ΠJ such that∑
j∈J pj = 1. Then F varies linearly along the rational segment rJ joining pi
to p. More precisely, for p = αp+ (1−α)pi, with α ∈ [0, 1]∩Q, F (p) = αF (p).
Furthermore, we have F (p) = γJpi
∑
i∈N |pi − pii| for some real number γJpi .
Proof. If ΠJ = {pi}, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, using Lemma 4,
there is p ∈ ΠJ such that
∑
j∈J pj = 1 = maxp∈ΠJ
∑
j∈J pj . Let p = αp+(1−
α)pi, for some α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q. Such a point belongs to ΠJ since ΠJ is rational
convex. We define the function G : [0, 1]∩Q→ R+ by G(α) = F (p). Consider
another point q = βp+ (1− β)pi, β ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q. We have (p+ q)/2 ∈ ΠJ and
p+ q
2
=
α+ β
2
p+
(
1− α+ β
2
)
pi.
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Hence (2) can be rewritten as G
(
α+β
2
)
= G(α)+G(β)2 . This is Jensen’s equation
and it holds for all rational α, β ∈ [0, 1]. Its unique solution is G(α) = aα+ b
[1, p.43]. Hence F (αp+ (1− α)pi) = αa+ b.
Letting α = 0, we obtain F (pi) = 0 = b. Letting α = 1, F (p) = a obtains.
Hence, F (αp + (1 − α)pi) = αF (p). This proves that F varies linearly along
the rational segment rJ joining pi to p.
If p = αp+ (1− α)pi, then
∑
j∈J
pj =
∑
j∈J
(αpj+(1−α)pij) = α
∑
j∈J
pj+(1−α)
∑
j∈J
pij =
∑
j∈J
pij+α
1−∑
j∈J
pij
 .
Hence α =
∑
j∈J (pj−pij)
1−∑j∈J pij . Since
∑
j∈J(pj − pij) +
∑
j /∈J(pj − pij) = 0, we get
α =
∑
j∈J(pj − pij)−
∑
j /∈J(pj − pij)
2
(
1−∑j∈J pij) =
∑
j∈J(pj − pij) +
∑
j /∈J |pj − pij |
2
(
1−∑j∈J pij) =
∑
j∈N |pj − pij |
2
(
1−∑j∈J pij)
and
F (αp+ (1− α)pi) =
∑
j∈N |pj − pij |
2
(
1−∑j∈J pij)F (p).
Letting γJpi =
F (p)
2(1−∑j∈J pij) , we obtain F (αp+ (1−α)pi) = γJpi
∑
j∈N |pj − pij | .
2
Lemma 7 ∀J ⊂ N, J 6= ∅, ∀q ∈ ΠJ , ∃p = αp+ (1− α)pi s.t. q ∈ P (p, pi).
Proof. Let α =
∑
j∈J (qj−pij)∑
j /∈J pij
. For p = αp+ (1− α)pi, straightforward calcu-
lations show that
∑
j∈J pj =
∑
j∈J qj and therefore q ∈ P (p, pi). 2
Lemma 8 Suppose pi is fixed and f satisfies Homogeneity, Substitution and
Radial Linearity. For every J ⊂ N, J 6= ∅, ∀p ∈ ΠJ , F (p) = γJpi
∑
i∈N |pi − pii|
for some real number γJpi .
Proof. Fix J . If ΠJ = {pi}, there is nothing to prove. We suppose henceforth
that ΠJ 6= {pi}. For any p ∈ ΠJ , by Lemma 7, there is q = αp + (1 − α)pi
such that p ∈ P (q, pi) and, by Lemma 5, F (p) = F (q). By Lemma 6, F (p) =
F (q) = γJpi
∑
i∈N |qi − pii|.
Since p and q both belong to ΠJ and
∑
j∈J qj =
∑
j∈J pj (see proof
of Lemma 7), we have
∑
i∈N |qi − pii| =
∑
i∈N |pi − pii|. Therefore, F (p) =
F (q) = γJpi
∑
i∈N |qi − pii| = γJpi
∑
i∈N |pi − pii|. 2
Lemma 9 Suppose pi is fixed and f satisfies Homogeneity, Substitution and
Radial Linearity. There is some γpi ∈ R++ such that, ∀J ⊂ N, J 6= ∅ and for
every p ∈ ΠJ , we have F (p) = γpi
∑
i∈N |pi − pii|.
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Proof. Let I ⊆ N be such that |I| ≥ 2 and j ∈ I. Define J = I \ {j}.
If ΠJ = {pi}, then we can choose γJpi equal to γIpi without any consequence.
Otherwise, there exists p ∈ ΠI ∩ ΠJ , with p 6= pi. It is such that pj = pij .
Because p ∈ ΠI ∩ΠJ , we can write (by Lemma 8)
F (p) = γIpi
∑
i∈N
|pi − pii| = γJpi
∑
i∈N
|pi − pii| .
Since
∑
i∈N |pi − pii| 6= 0 (because p 6= pi), we obtain γIpi = γJpi .
Consider now a set I ⊆ N such that |I| ≤ n−2 and i /∈ I. Define J = I∪{i}.
The same reasoning as above shows that γIpi = γ
J
pi .
Let I and K be two arbitrary non-empty subsets such that I 6= N 6= K.
We want to show that γIpi = γ
K
pi . We consider two exclusive cases.
1. I ∩K 6= ∅. We rename the elements of I \K so that I \K = {y1, . . . , yk}.
Using the reasoning in the first part of this proof, we find γIpi = γ
I\{y1}
pi =
γ
I\{y1,y2}
pi = . . . = γ
I\(I\K)
pi = γI∩Kpi . We rename the elements of K \ I so
that K \I = {z1, . . . , zl}. Using the reasoning in the first part of this proof,
we find γIpi = γ
I∩K
pi = γ
(I∩K)∪{z1}
pi = γ
(I∩K)∪{z1,z2}
pi = . . . = γ
(I∩K)∪(K\I)
pi .
Since (I ∩K) ∪ (K \ I) = K, we have proven that γIpi = γKpi .
2. I ∩K = ∅. We rename the elements of I so that I = {y1, . . . , yk}. Using
the reasoning in the first part of this proof , we find γIpi = γ
I\{y1}
pi =
γ
I\{y1,y2}
pi = . . . = γ
I\{y1,...,yk−1}
pi = γ
{yk}
pi . Notice we have not removed yk
from I to avoid considering an empty set. We will remove yk later.
We rename the elements of K so that K = {z1, . . . , zl}. Using again the
reasoning in the first part of the proof of this lemma, we find γIpi = γ
{yk}
pi =
γ
{yk}∪{z1}
pi = γ
{yk}∪{z1,z2}
pi = γ
{yk}∪{z1,...,zl}
pi = γ{z1,...,zl} = γKpi .
This proves that γIpi = γ
J
pi for all non-empty subsets I, J of N . Finally,
γpi ∈ R++ because we have imposed in our definition of the diversity index
that f(x, pi) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and f(x, pi) = 0 iff x/s(x) = pi. 2
Proof of Theorem 1. Necessity has already been proved. We first as-
sume pi is fixed. According to Lemma 9 and to the definition of F and g (see
Lemma 1), we can write f(x, pi) = g(x) = γpi
∑
i∈N |xi/s(x)− pii|.
Suppose now pi is allowed to vary. By the first part of Theorem 1, we have
f(x, pi) = γpi
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣, for every pi ∈ Π. Let pi∗ ∈ Π be a target such
that pi∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N . We will show that, for any pi ∈ Π, we have γpi = γpi∗ .
Let λ be a natural number such that λpi, λpi∗ ∈ NN and λpij , λpi∗j ≥ 1 for
some j ∈ N . By Invariance,
f(λpi + 1i − 1j , pi) = 2γpi/λ = f(λpi∗ + 1i − 1j , pi∗) = 2γpi∗/λ.
Hence γpi = γpi∗ . This proves that γpi does actually not depend on pi.
For the logical independence of the properties in Theorem 1, we provide
four examples violating one and only one property.
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– Invariance: f(x, pi) = γpi
∑
i∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣, with γpi non-constant and posi-
tive. For instance, we could choose γpi in such a way that f be normalized
between 0 and 1, i.e., such that maxx∈X f(x, pi) = 1.
– Homogeneity: f(x, pi) =
∑
i∈N |xi − s(x)pii| . This index is similar to fDD
but is based on deviations between absolute frequencies instead of devia-
tions between relative frequencies.
– Substitution (when n ≥ 3): f(x, pi) = fL(x, pi).
– Radial Linearity: f(x, pi) =
(∑
i∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣)2 . 2
Proof of Proposition 1. Case n = 2. Suppose x ∈ ΠJ , with J ⊂ N
and J 6= ∅. We assume w.l.o.g. J = {1}. Then
∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ x2s(x) − pi2∣∣∣ =
max
(∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣ x2s(x) − pi2∣∣∣). Hence,∑i∈N ∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣ = 2 maxi∈N ∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣ .
Case n = 3. Suppose x ∈ ΠJ , with J ⊂ N and J non-empty. Two cases
can arise: (1) J = {i} or (2) J = {i, j}. In case (1), we assume w.l.o.g.
J = {1}. Then
∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣ x2s(x) − pi2∣∣∣ + ∣∣∣ x3s(x) − pi3∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1∣∣∣ ≥
max
(∣∣∣ x2s(x) − pi2∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣ x3s(x) − pi3∣∣∣). Hence,∑
i∈N
∣∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ x2s(x) − pi2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ x3s(x) − pi3
∣∣∣∣
= 2
∣∣∣∣ x1s(x) − pi1
∣∣∣∣ = 2 maxi∈N
∣∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii
∣∣∣∣ .
In case (2), the reasoning is similar. 2
Lemma 10 (necessity of some conditions for fL). Index fL satisfies Homogeneity,
Radial Linearity, Substitution* and Invariance.
Proof. We already proved that Substitution* is necessary and Homogeneity
obviously holds. Let us show the necessity of Radial Linearity. We have
fL
(
x+ y
2
, pi
)
= max
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xi + yi2s(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 12 maxi∈N
∣∣∣∣2pii − xi + yis(x)
∣∣∣∣ = 12 maxi∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x) + pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣ .
Using x = αs(x)pi+(1−α)y and the fact that pii−xi/s(x) ≥ 0 iff pii−yi/s(y) ≥
0, we have fL
(
x+y
2 , pi
)
=
1
2
max
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x) + pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣ = 12 maxi∈N
(∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x)
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣)
=
1
2
(
max
i∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − xis(x)
∣∣∣∣+ maxi∈N
∣∣∣∣pii − yis(y)
∣∣∣∣) = fL(x, pi) + fL(y, pi)2 .
Necessity of Invariance: fL(λpi+ 1
i−1j , pi) = ∣∣λpii+1λ − pii∣∣ = 1/λ. In the same
way, fL(λpi
′ + 1i − 1j , pi′) = 1/λ. This proves that fL(λpi + 1i − 1j , pi) =
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fL(λpi
′ + 1i − 1j , pi′). 2
For every i ∈ N , pi being fixed, define Π+i = {p ∈ Π : pi − pii ≥
|pj − pij | ∀j ∈ N \ {i}} and Π−i = {p ∈ Π : pii − pi ≥ |pj − pij | ∀j ∈ N \ {i}}.
If n = 2 or 3, then, ∀i ∈ N , Π+i = Π{i} and Π−i = ΠN\{i} (Π{i} has been de-
fined just after the proof of Lemma 2). But these identities are no longer true
when n > 3. Notice that
⋃
i∈N (Π
+
i ∪ Π−i ) = Π. These sets do not partition
Π because they intersect. In particular, ∀i ∈ N , the point pi belongs to Π+i
and Π−i . Notice also that Π
+
i and Π
−
i contain only one point in some cases.
More precisely, Π+i = {pi} if pii = 1. Similarly, Π−i = {pi} if pii = 0.
Lemma 11 Suppose pi is fixed. For i ∈ N , the set Π+i is rational convex, i.e.,
∀p, q ∈ Π+i , ∀α ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, αp+ (1− α)q ∈ Π+i . Π−i is also rational convex.
Proof. This results from the fact that Π+i is the intersection of n ratio-
nal convex sets: (1) n − 1 sets corresponding to the inequalities pi − pii ≥
|pj − pij | ∀j ∈ N \ {i} and (2) the set Π. The proof for Π−i is similar 2
Given a point p ∈ Π, there can be several i ∈ N such that p ∈ Π+i
or p ∈ Π−i . For every p ∈ Π, if p ∈ Π+i , we define the set P+(p, i) ={
q ∈ Π+i : qi = pi
}
and, if p ∈ Π−i , we define the set P−(p, i) =
{
q ∈ Π−i : qi = pi
}
.
Notice that P+(p, i) and P−(p, i) are included in an affine subspace of di-
mension n − 2 containing p. This affine subspace is the intersection of the
hyperplane
∑
i∈N pi = 1 with the hyperplane defined by qi = pi.
Lemma 12 Suppose pi is fixed and the diversity index f satisfies Homogeneity
and Substitution*. For every i ∈ N , for every p ∈ Π+i (resp. Π−i ),
1. ∀q ∈ P+(p, i) (resp. P−(p, i)), we have F (p) = F (q), with F as in Lemma 1;
2. F (p) depends only on pi.
Proof. We prove it only for p ∈ Π+i and q ∈ P+(p, i).
(1) Consider some p, q as in the statement of the lemma. By definition of F ,
there are x, y such that p = x/s(x) and q = y/s(y). By Homogeneity, f(x, pi) =
f(s(y)x, pi) and f(y, pi) = f(s(x)y, pi). The two parliaments s(y)x and s(x)y
have the same size. Moreover qi = pi. We therefore have s(x)yi = s(y)xi.
This means that we can ‘move’ from s(x)y to s(y)x by a series of successive
exchanges between pairs of dimensions different from i, as in the statement of
Substitution*. Therefore, f(s(x)y, pi) = f(s(y)x, pi) and F (p) = F (q).
(2) For every q ∈ P+(p, i), F (q) = F (p). Besides, q ∈ P+(p, i) iff qi = pi.
Therefore, F (q) only depends on qi and F (p) only depends on pi. 2
Lemma 13 Suppose pi is fixed. Define the line segment ri (resp. si) with
endpoints pi and 1i (resp. pi and (pi− (pii1i))/(1−pii)). For every p ∈ Π+i , the
set P+(p, i) intersects ri. For every p ∈ Π−i , the set P−(p, i) intersects si.
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Proof. By construction, ri ∈ Π+i and si ∈ Π−i . For every p ∈ Π+i , we
have pii ≤ pi ≤ 1. By construction, there is q ∈ ri such that qi = pi. Hence
q ∈ P+(p, i). For every p ∈ Π−i , we have 0 ≤ pi ≤ pii. By construction, there
is q ∈ si such that qi = pi. Hence q ∈ P−(p, i). 2
Lemma 14 Suppose pi is fixed and f satisfies Homogeneity and Radial Linearity.
For each i ∈ N , F varies linearly along ri in Π+i (resp. si in Π−i ).
Proof. We prove it only for Π+i . If Π
+
i = {pi}, there is nothing to prove.
We suppose henceforth that Π+i 6= {pi}. Every point of ri can be written as
αpi + (1 − α)p, with α ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q. Define the mapping G : [0, 1] ∩ Q → R+
by G(α) = F (p) if p = αpi + (1− α)p. G is clearly well-defined. Consider any
two points p, q ∈ ri, the position of which on ri is characterized by α and
β respectively. Clearly, (p + q)/2 ∈ ri and p+q2 = α+β2 pi +
(
1− α+β2
)
p with
(α+β)/2 ∈ [0, 1]∩Q. Hence (2) can be written as G
(
α+β
2
)
= G(α)+G(β)2 . This
is Jensen’s equation and it holds for all α, β ∈ [0, 1] ∩ Q. Its unique solution
is G(α) = aα+b [1, p.43]. Hence, F varies linearly along the line segment ri. 2
Lemma 15 Suppose pi is fixed and the diversity index f satisfies Homogeneity,
Substitution* and Radial Linearity. For every i ∈ N , for every p ∈ Π+i ,
F (p) = γ+i,pi maxi∈N |pi − pii| for some positive real number γ+i,pi. Similarly,
for every i ∈ N , for every p ∈ Π−i , F (p) = γ−i,pi maxi∈N |pi − pii| for some
positive real number γ−i,pi.
Proof. We prove it only for Π+i . Fix i. If Π
+
i = {pi}, there is nothing to
prove. We suppose henceforth that Π+i 6= {pi}. We know from Lemma 12 that
F is constant in each set P+(p, i), for all p ∈ Π+i , and depends only on pi.
By Lemma 13, we know that each set P+(p, i) intersects the line segment ri.
Finally, Lemma 14 tells us that F varies linearly along ri.
In conclusion, F (p) = γ+i,pipi+δ
+
i for some real numbers γ
+
i,pi, δ
+
i . Notice that
these real numbers are indexed by i because they can be different in every set
Π+i . The definition of a diversity index imposes that F (pi) = γ
+
i,pipii + δ
+
i = 0.
Hence, δ+i = −γ+i,pipii and F (p) = γ+i,pi(pi − pii) = γ+i,pi maxj∈N |pj − pij |. 2
Lemma 16 Suppose n ≥ 3, pi is fixed and the diversity index f satisfies
Homogeneity, Substitution* and Radial Linearity. There exists γpi ∈ R++ such
that, for every i ∈ N and for every p ∈ Π+i , F (p) = γpi maxi∈N |pi − pii|.
Proof. Choose some i ∈ N with Π+i 6= {pi}. Choose some other j ∈ N . If
Π−j = {pi}, then we can choose γ−j,pi equal to γ+i,pi without any consequence.
Otherwise, define p by pi = pii + , pj = pij −  and pk = pik for every k 6= i, j.
If we choose  small enough, we are sure that p ∈ Π+i ∩Π−j , with p 6= pi. Be-
cause p ∈ Π+i ∩Π−j , we have (by Lemma 15) F (p) = γ+i,pi maxi∈N |pi − pii| =
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γ−j,pi maxi∈N |pi − pii| . Since maxi∈N |pi − pii| 6= 0 (because p 6= pi), we obtain
γ+i,pi = γ
−
j,pi. We can repeat the same reasoning and we then find for instance
γ+i,pi = γ
−
j,pi = γ
+
k,pi = γ
−
i,pi = . . . This proves that γ
+
i,pi = γ
+
j,pi = γ
−
i,pi = γ
−
j,pi for
all i, j ∈ N . Finally, γpi ∈ R++ because, by definition of the diversity index,
f(x, pi) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and f(x, pi) = 0 iff x/s(x) = pi. 2
Proof of Theorem 2. Necessity has been proved in Lemma 10. If n =
2, Substitution and Substitution* are vacuous and, hence, the properties of
theorems 2 and 1 are equivalent. We therefore know that f = γpifDD for some
γpi. By Proposition 1, we also know that fDD = 2fL. In conclusion, f = 2γpifL.
We now assume pi is fixed and n ≥ 3. Thanks to Lemma 16 and the defini-
tion of F and g (Lemma 1), we find f(x, pi) = g(x) = γpi maxi∈N |xi/s(x)− pii|.
We turn to the case where pi is allowed to vary. By Theorem 2, we know
that, for every pi ∈ Π, f(x, pi) = γpi maxi∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣. Let pi∗ ∈ Π be a target
such that pi∗i > 0 for all i ∈ N . We will show that, ∀pi ∈ Π, we have γpi = γpi∗ .
Let λ be a natural number such that λpi, λpi∗ ∈ NN and λpij , λpi∗j ≥ 1 for some
j ∈ N . By Invariance, f(λpi+1i−1j , pi) = γpi/λ = f(λpi∗+1i−1j , pi∗) = γpi∗/λ.
Hence γpi = γpi∗ . This proves that γpi does actually not depend on pi and that
f can be written as in the statement of Theorem 2.
For the logical independence of the properties in Theorem 2, we provide
four examples violating one and only one property.
– Invariance: f(x, pi) = γpi maxi∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣ , with γpi > 0 and non-constant.
– Homogeneity: f(x, pi) = maxi∈N |xi − s(x)pii| .
– Substitution*: f(x, pi) = fDD(x, pi).
– Radial Linearity: f(x, pi) =
(
maxi∈N
∣∣∣ xis(x) − pii∣∣∣)2 . 2
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